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Abstract. An important aspect that must be considered when studying
opinion formation phenomena is the different social attitude of the agents
taking part in the process. Different kinds of interconnections and of
interacting behaviours should be associated to the agents depending on
their opinion: radicals tend to self-segregate but, on the other hand,
have a stronger capacity to convince neutral agents. Other important
questions arise when the official media strongly promotes one position.
The different perception that each agent has of the official information
can lead, in case of monopolistic and aggressive media, to a reaction
effect in the population that starts to create massive antagonist clusters.
1 Introduction
In 1969 Nixon introduced the concept of “silent majority”: Demonstrations
against the war in Vietnam were taking place all around the US and to en-
force his warmonger decision Nixon exploited the neutral, inactive position of
the silent majority that was not participating to the riots: those who do not
protest support the war. The wrong passage in this argument is the assumption
that the silent majority was supporting the war: when a state enters a war, when
politicians decide laws, when a company decides a shake-out, when any group
has to make a common decision, some people will line up on one position, others
will play an antagonist role but the larger part of the people will not decide,
simply adopting a neutral position.
The delegation mechanism induces people not to have their own opinion on
the single topics, to remain inactive in order to avoid conflict and to move the
discussion mechanism to higher political levels. The radical position formation,
instead, often requires a more or less deep study and documentation phase. This
different kind of choice, neutrality vs. radicalism, implies a different communica-
tive attitude between different kinds of agents: while radicals will prefer to be
surrounded by people sharing similar ideas, a neutral agent will not have any a
priori preclusion in interacting with anybody. On the other side, when a neutral
agent interacts with a radical one, the formation process underwent by the radi-
cal in the decisional phase will give him bigger chance to have a strong influence
on neutral agents.
We consider these different communication attitudes and we show that, in ab-
sence of external forcing, a pluralistic situation (where many opinions persist)
is reached only when the extremists are integrated in the society and strongly
consistent on their positions.
In presence of media campaigns supporting one of the positions, instead, we find
that as the power of the media grows, a secondary antagonist cluster appears to
contrast the monopolistic forcing, even in the setting that would have lead to
total consensus without media.
2 Model description
Many model have been constructed to describe opinion formation processes in
presence of extremist groups, such as, for example, the one in [3]. We want to
consider this kind of analyses, where different rules for social influence are imple-
mented, in a more complete framework where the structure of the social network
is also considered.
We consider a set of agents with opinion oi randomly extracted in the range
[−1, 1]. We term “radical” an agent with opinion near the extremes, and “neu-
tral” an agent with opinion approximatively zero. We start from the assumption
that a radical agent will preferentially link to radicals, while neutrals will choose
their relationships in a completely random fashion.3
As for the dynamical part, we refer again to [1]. A tolerance, depending on the
opinion, is associated to each agent:
ti = 1− α|oi| α ∈ [0, 1] . (1)
Two agents interact only if |oi − oj | < min(ti, tj). If the agents interact, an
asymmetric shift of the opinion in the radical direction is performed:4
oi → oi + µ · ti(oj − oi) . (2)
The parameter α tunes how the dynamics is sensitive to the opinion difference:
if α = 0 we have the standard Deffuant model [2] (at its very critical point),
characterised by uniform tolerance and symmetric drift after the interaction.
For α = 1 we have the maximum differentiation of the behaviours of the agents:
a radical will discuss only with very similar agents and a more extreme position
will have a stronger attractive strength in the dynamics.
We observe a critical value of the dynamical parameter, αc ≃ 0.8, such that for
α < αc the system converges to a single opinion while, for α > αc, the final state
shows a larger number of final-state opinions, as is illustrated in the leftmost
plots of Fig. 1. This behaviour is due to the fact that the network structure is
3 To model this situation, we start from a set of randomly connected nodes and we
add, one by one, new nodes with random opinion oN connecting the new nodes to
the pre–existing ones with probability: PN→i ∝ exp[−β · oN (oN − oi)]. We fix the
parameter of the model to β = 3 and work on a system with N = 1000 agents.
4 In the following, the constant µ is always kept fixed to its maximum value 0.5, since
apparently only the speed at which the final state is reached is sensitive to it, and
not the final state itself.
strongly correlated to the initial opinions of the agents. Such correlation permits
the existence of gradual paths of communication that always lead to convergence.
The survival of minority clusters for α > αc is due to the fact that, in this situa-
tion, the most extremist agents are not involved in the global opinion dynamics
process since their tolerance is too small to interact with someone far from their
ideas; they just interact with very similar agents creating a sort of opinion niche.
From this reasoning, it follows also that the number of such sub–communities
increases with α, while the population of each sub–community decreases.
2.1 The media influence
We want to investigate the effect on this model of a strong media campaign
supporting one of the two extremal positions.
Several mechanisms can explain the media influence on people: it can be consid-
ered an indirect effect, like the so called third person effect [4], where each agent
feels the influence of the media on the others and not on herself. Alternatively,
it can be considered a direct effect represented by some “Big–Agent” completely
connected with the whole network. We will consider only the latter mechanism
introducing a “Big–Agent” (BA) with opinion oBA = +1. This agent interacts
with all agents at every step of the opinion dynamics (namely, every nagent in-
teractions), with the usual tolerance rule (1) and without changing her opinion
at all. The strength of the campaign (sensitive, for example, to whether it is
also supported by police repression of the opposite idea) affects the interaction
of the media with any agent: we model this persuasive strength by introducing
a parameter ε ∈ [0, 1] in the opinion update rule (2):
oi → oi + µ · εti(oBA − oi) . (3)
For ε = 0, the media pressure is null and we find the basic model; as ε grows,
the media campaign becomes more aggressive.
For any value of ε > 0 the central cluster moves to the BA’s opinion, so that the
neutral position is no longer represented. The surprising result is that for ε→ 1
the size of the biggest cluster (that which supports the BA’s opinion) decreases,
while a more and more populated antagonist cluster appears near the opposite
extreme (Fig. 1).
This kind of result, where a media influence excessively strong does not lead to
consensus, is in agreement with the result previously obtained in [5] for the case
of Axelrod model.
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Fig. 1. (colour online) Agents’ opinions as a function of time. The upper plots refer to
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